



# FROM OUTRAGE TO INTIMIDATION: THE ONLINE CAMPAIGN AGAINST MTV

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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On March 15, 2026, MTV aired a report on alleged Hezbollah detention sites in Lebanon and the use of extra-legal investigations. Soon after the report aired, posts began circulating on X accusing MTV of exposing sensitive locations and helping Israel identify targets in Beirut's southern suburbs. In the material reviewed for this report, that accusation quickly became the central line around which the online backlash was organized.

The backlash did not remain confined to criticism of the report. It developed into a punitive online campaign marked by accusations of treason and collaboration, calls to isolate the channel and its platforms, circulation of what appear to be personal contact details, and explicit threats of physical violence against those who work at or with MTV. The reviewed material shows that the campaign moved rapidly from denunciation to intimidation.

This report reconstructs that wave through a combined review of exported X material and a manually assembled screenshot archive documenting the campaign's earliest phase. The findings show a compressed sequence in which a core accusation emerged early, was reinforced through repeated bursts of activity, and then sustained through reposting, recycled visuals, repeated replies, and escalating threats. Within that process, MTV was recast not as a broadcaster under criticism, but as a hostile actor that must be publicly sanctioned.

The report also places the backlash in context. The detention site file was already in public circulation before March 2026, including through earlier reporting on alleged Hezbollah detention sites in Beirut's southern suburbs. The issue was also politically charged because it intersected with a wider record of unresolved detention and disappearance allegations and longstanding concerns around the military judiciary and due process violations in Lebanon.

In addition, the report examines the account environment that helped drive the wave. A review of selected accounts identified a layered participation structure in which a smaller number of accounts helped introduce or consolidate the accusation, more visible political and media-aligned voices amplified its reach, and a broader set of accounts extended and reinforced it through reposting, repetition, and escalatory content. While this analysis does not establish coordination or common control, it does identify a structured pattern of politically aligned amplification within the documented wave.

Taken together, the findings show how, in a highly polarized wartime context, a single accusation can be rapidly stabilized, amplified, and weaponized in ways that increase risks for journalists and media institutions. The case underscores the importance of close monitoring when online backlash moves beyond criticism into targeted intimidation, exposure, and threats of violence.

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# INTRODUCTION

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On March 15, 2026, MTV aired a report addressing the alleged Hezbollah detention sites in Lebanon. The report identified five such sites across residential areas in Beirut's southern suburbs and included a previously broadcast testimony from Future TV, in which a woman from Dahiyeh described being summoned to one of these centers.

The report framed the issue beyond the existence of unofficial detention sites, pointing instead to a broader system of extra-legal detention and interrogation. The report raised questions about how Hezbollah-held detainees could later be incorporated into military court cases, highlighting the possible intersection between unlawful investigative practices and formal judicial processes.

Shortly after the broadcast, posts began circulating on X accusing MTV of exposing sensitive locations and facilitating Israeli targeting in Beirut's southern suburbs. The accusation spread through screenshots from the report, maps, and posts linking MTV's coverage to a subsequent strike near one of the locations mentioned. In the material reviewed for this study, this claim quickly became the central narrative around which the online backlash formed.

The backlash evolved rapidly and took multiple forms of digital intimidation and abuse. It circulated through high volumes of posting, influencer amplification, repost chains, and repeated use of similar content. These dynamics produced recurring accusation formulas, calls to punish MTV's platforms, and explicit threats directed at the channel and individuals associated with it, including its CEO and various reporters. This research project examines how the campaign developed, how it escalated, and the types of accounts and tactics that contributed to sustaining it.

## BACKGROUND: A SENSITIVE TOPIC

The file MTV touched was not new. A report published by Al Arabiya in October 2019 had already examined the exact same alleged Hezbollah detention sites in Dahiyeh and listed several locations in print. By the time the March 2026 backlash began, the broader detention site file, along with related location claims, had been in public circulation for years.

This does not resolve all factual disputes surrounding the March 2026 incident. It does clarify a point that is relevant for this report: the campaign's accusation treated MTV's broadcast as if it had revealed previously unknown sites. The material reviewed does not support that characterization.

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Prior reporting had already documented the existence of these allegations, and references to specific locations would not have been new to actors already following the file.

The issue was also politically sensitive because it is part of a wider set of unresolved detention and disappearance cases in Lebanon. Among them is the case of Joseph Sader, a Middle East Airlines employee abducted in 2009 while on his way to Beirut airport, whose fate remains unresolved. Public reporting has also kept attention on the disappearance of Shehadeh Dib al-Fliti, a Lebanese Army soldier who went missing in 2013. These cases, along with others that have received less visibility, have sustained public concern around disappearance and unlawful detention.

The military court dimension adds another layer of sensitivity. Human Rights Watch has documented longstanding due process concerns in Lebanon's military court, including interrogations conducted without legal counsel, incommunicado detention, torture, and the use of coerced confessions as evidence. This does not establish the claims made in MTV's March 2026 report. It does, however, help explain why reporting that connects extra-legal detention practices to cases later handled by the military judiciary touches a particularly sensitive area within Lebanon's legal and security apparatus.

More recent cases illustrate that the issue of unlawful detention remains active. In January 2026, Al Arabiya reported on the case of Mohammad Harqous, whose father accused Hezbollah of kidnapping him before his body was returned, and alleged collusion with army intelligence. The case reignited concerns around allegations of unlawful detention, torture, and concealment, underscoring that this is not only a legacy issue, but an ongoing source of controversy.

# METHODOLOGY

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This report is based on a combined analysis of two datasets reviewed in parallel.

The first dataset consists of an export of publicly available posts from X collected on March 17, 2026 through the Samir Kassir Foundation's Early Warning System (EWS). The EWS is a monitoring mechanism designed to detect emerging online campaigns involving disinformation, hate speech, and targeted harassment, particularly those affecting journalists and the broader information ecosystem. It relies on targeted data collection from a curated set of accounts and keywords associated with high-risk narratives and actors, and enables the identification of early signals such as spikes in activity, shifts in tone, and the rapid circulation of similar content.

At its current stage, the EWS system supports near-real-time monitoring and incorporates analytical modules such as Arabic-language sentiment analysis, identification of targeted individuals or groups, and basic virality tracking based on engagement dynamics and posting velocity. It also enables the detection of clusters of similar posts within short timeframes.

For the purposes of this report, the export was used to identify recurring language, dominant accusation frames, and observable patterns in how the discussion evolved on the platform. The dataset reflects a structured subset of activity captured through the system's monitoring parameters and does not represent the entirety of online discussion across platforms.

The second dataset consists of a manually assembled archive of 200+ screenshots documenting the campaign's early phase and subsequent escalation. These screenshots preserve original post context, attached visuals, and, in many cases, timestamps as displayed on the platform. In some instances, the same post appears multiple times, either because it was captured at different moments as engagement increased or because it reappeared across replies and search results. Where relevant, they were used as potential indicators of recirculation and persistence, and engagement growth.

The analysis focused on five observable indicators: (1) accusations that MTV had acted outside the national interest or crossed into betrayal; (2) claims that the channel had served Israeli interests or reproduced Israeli narrative; (3) calls for punitive action against MTV's platforms or presence; (4) the circulation of personal contact details or identifying information linked to individuals associated with the channel; and (5) explicit threats of physical violence, including references to attacks against MTV headquarters or personnel.

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In addition to these indicators, the review examined patterns of content repetition, recurrence of identical or near-identical phrasing, repost chains, and temporal clustering of posts within short time windows. These observable patterns were used to assess how specific narratives circulated and amplified.

This analysis does not establish intent, coordination, or authorship beyond what is directly observable in the material. Where relevant, the report identifies patterns consistent with amplification. The findings should therefore be read as a pattern visible within the reviewed corpus, rather than a comprehensive account of all activity across platforms or a determination of the actors involved.

# THE FINDINGS

## TIMELINE OF THE WAVE

The screenshot archive indicates that the campaign developed through a series of temporally clustered bursts rather than from a single post.

**Figure 1. Pre-midnight post from the campaign's earliest documented burst**



The earliest documented material appears shortly before midnight on March 15, followed by after-midnight surges, a more pronounced increase in activity after 12:20 a.m., and a dense escalation phase after 12:30 a.m. A later phase consists primarily of continued circulation of previously established narratives.

A preliminary temporal review of more than 200 timestamped screenshot instances provides an indication of how activity was distributed across these phases:

**Table A. Preliminary distribution of manually documented screenshot instances by time cluster**

Time cluster	Preliminary estimated count	Main pattern
11:42 p.m. - 11:58 p.m.	~23	Pre-midnight ignition
12:04 a.m. - 12:18 a.m.	~23	Early consolidation
12:23 a.m. - 12:30 a.m.	~38	First amplification burst
12:33 a.m. - 12:49 a.m.	~87	Main escalation burst
1:34 a.m. - 1:46 a.m.	~30	Secondary reinforcement / booster activity

These are provisional estimates based on the distribution observed in the timestamp-confirmed subset of the screenshot archive and should be read as estimates of documented screenshot density, not unique posts.

Even with this limitation, the concentration of activity is clear: the most intense phase falls between 12:33 a.m. and 12:49 a.m.

The pre-midnight material is significant because it shows that the central accusation was already articulated before the main surge. One of the clearest early posts in the archive is Ghaleb Ghosn’s 11:56 p.m. post accusing MTV of publishing coordinates for Israel. Read alongside other posts from the same interval, it shows that the campaign’s core framing was already in place before the larger after-midnight escalation.

**Figure 2. Early post by Ghaleb Ghosn accusing MTV of publishing coordinates for Israel**



Between 12:23 a.m. and 12:30 a.m., posts begin attributing direct responsibility to MTV for the reported strike. By the 12:33 a.m. to 12:49 a.m. cluster, this attribution appears at higher volume, with recurring claims presenting MTV as aligned with Israel, deserving of sanction, and responsible for bloodshed.

**Figure 3. Post from the first amplification burst assigning direct moral responsibility to MTV for the strike**



The density of similar claims within a short time window suggests a rapid consolidation of narrative rather than a gradual evolution of debate.

**Figure 4. Example from the main escalation burst**



The later phase, between approximately 1:34 a.m. and 1:46 a.m., differs in character. It contains fewer instances of new framing and more repetition, shorter interventions, and recurring phrasing across multiple posts. This pattern is consistent with continued circulation and amplification of an already established narrative.

Taken together, the temporal distribution suggests a sequence in which a core accusation emerges early, is reinforced through successive bursts of activity, and then sustained through repetition across the platform. While this reconstruction does not establish coordination or intent, it highlights how when circulated systematically, a single framing can quickly become dominant within a compressed timeframe.

## **STONE OF THE CAMPAIGN**

The tone of the campaign was shaped by a shift in framing: a dispute over media coverage was recast as a question of wartime loyalty.

This shift narrowed the space for disagreement almost immediately. If the issue had remained one of editorial judgment, the debate might have remained within the bounds of criticism. Instead, posts framing MTV as hostile, complicit, and morally reprehensible quickly came to dominate the online backlash. This shifted the discussion away from disagreement over coverage and toward a climate of intimidation and retaliatory hostility. Within that framing, calls for punitive action appeared as an expected response.

This helps explain why threats, doxing, and calls for retaliation were not isolated elements at the margins of the discourse. They were consistent with the dominant framing visible in the material. A media outlet portrayed as aiding the enemy is no longer positioned as a participant in a debate, but as a target of sanction.

## **MAIN TACTICS**

The reviewed material points to several recurring mechanisms through which this framing circulated and intensified:

### **1. Accusation as mobilization**

A central feature of the campaign was the rapid stabilization of a simple and highly charged claim: that MTV had served Israeli interests. Whether or not individual posts substantiated this claim varied, but its function within the discourse was clear. It provided a shared interpretation around which reactions could align, making subsequent escalation appear coherent and justified within that narrative.

### **2. Visual recycling**

The screenshot archive shows repeated use of similar visual elements, including outage pages, platform error messages, maps or location graphics, and branded imagery. These visuals allowed users to circulate the accusation in condensed form, reducing the need for explanation.

### 3. Repost chaining and message packaging

Content that condensed the accusation into short, reusable formulations appears to have circulated more widely. This type of message packaging enabled rapid reposting and amplification, allowing users to participate in the wave without adding substantial original content.

### 4. Doxing

The material includes instances that appear to involve the circulation of personal contact details and identifying information linked to individuals associated with MTV. This marks a shift from generalized hostility to targeted exposure, increasing the vulnerability of specific individuals and raising the stakes of participation in the campaign.

### 5. Explicit threats of violence

The most severe content in the archive includes direct threats or calls for physical violence, including references to attacking MTV headquarters or assaulting individuals associated with the station. In many cases, this language is explicit rather than implied.

## INDICATORS OF MEDIA RISK

The campaign did more than respond to a report. It contributed to defining the boundaries of acceptable media conduct under wartime conditions.

At a general level, it reinforced a boundary in which media actors perceived to cross certain lines can be recast as internal adversaries. This extends beyond MTV and signals potential consequences for reporting on politically sensitive issues, which armed actors prefer to keep contained.


The accusation unfolded around a file that was already public and contested. Allegations related to detention sites, disappearances, and extra-legal investigations had circulated in Lebanon prior to March 2026. Within that context, the backlash shifted the discussion toward a simplified accusation centered on treason and disloyalty. The “MTV exposed coordinates” line redirected attention away from the underlying detention-related issue and toward the channel itself.

It would be a mistake to treat the doxing and threats of violence as incidental elements of the campaign. They are central to the environment that emerged around it.

There is a meaningful distinction between hostile expression and a threat environment. Hostile expression may involve strong criticism, denunciation, or even aggressive, derogatory language. A threat environment, by contrast, involves the targeting of identifiable individuals, the circulation

of personal information, and references to physical harm. In the material reviewed, that threshold was crossed. The reviewed material also included the recirculation of previously circulated intimate content, which users falsely or misleadingly linked to files allegedly leaked after the cyberattack against MTV.

**Figure 5. Example of doxing-style exposure of personal details linked to individuals associated with MTV**



The presence of doxing-style content, including the circulation of phone numbers and contact details, indicates a shift toward targeted exposure. This increases the vulnerability of specific individuals and lowers the barrier between online discourse and offline consequences.

Figure 6. Additional examples of the campaign



The presence of explicit threats further reinforces this shift. References to attacking MTV headquarters or assaulting individuals associated with the station introduce the possibility of physical harm. Their circulation contributes to an environment in which intimidation becomes a plausible outcome rather than a hypothetical risk.

Taken together, these elements point to a transformation in the function of the discourse and indicate a move toward deterrence: discouraging reporting, signaling potential consequences, raising the risks associated with reporting on sensitive issues amid war, thus decreased participation and coverage.

This distinction is essential for assessing risk. Campaigns that combine high-intensity framing with targeted exposure and explicit threats create conditions in which journalists and media workers may face elevated and immediate forms of harm, and therefore require a different level of monitoring and response.

This type of escalation underscores the importance of early detection mechanisms capable of identifying when online discourse moves from criticism and disagreement into targeted intimidation.

# DRIVERS OF THE CAMPAIGN


To complement the timeline and content analysis, this report reviewed 41 accounts drawn from the screenshot archive and the exported X dataset. These accounts were selected because they made direct, visible contributions to the documented wave, including early framing of the accusation, repeated amplification, and reinforcement through reposting or quote-posting. The review focused on the accounts most clearly involved in shaping, extending, or intensifying the wave, rather than on every account that commented on the incident.

For the purposes of this analysis, the reviewed accounts were grouped into three incident-specific roles: sources/originators, influencers, and spreaders. Sources/originators are accounts that introduced the accusation or helped consolidate it during the wave's early phase. Influencers are accounts whose posts drew disproportionate visibility or engagement during the incident window. Spreaders are accounts whose contribution consisted primarily of extending claims already in circulation through reposting, repetition, or related forms of reinforcement.

## METADATA PROFILE OF THE REVIEWED ACCOUNTS


The metadata profile of the 41 reviewed accounts is presented in Figures 6 to 9 and Table B below. These indicators are used here as descriptive context. They show what the reviewed set looked like in terms of account age, listed region, profile stability, visible political signaling, and posting style before turning to the roles these accounts played within the documented wave.

**Figure 7. Account creation date distribution of the 41 reviewed accounts**




The age profile of the reviewed accounts is mixed. The largest share was created between 2021 and 2024, alongside a substantial number of older, more established accounts and a smaller cluster of newer profiles created in 2025 or 2026.

**Figure 8. Listed country or region of the 41 reviewed accounts**




The reviewed set is centered on Lebanon but extends beyond it. Most accounts list Lebanon as their country, while others reflect a broader regional distribution. This indicates that the participating accounts were not exclusively local in their profile characteristics.

**Figure 9. Relationship between listed location and app/store metadata**



A noticeable minority of the reviewed accounts showed a mismatch between their listed location and app-store or app-connection metadata. Such discrepancies can reflect a range of benign factors and should be interpreted with caution, but they remain relevant as part of the overall descriptive profile of the participating set.

**Figure 10. Visible political signaling among the 41 reviewed accounts**



Visible political signaling is a prominent feature of the reviewed set. Most accounts displayed explicit Hezbollah or closely related ideological alignment in their profiles or recent activity, while only a small minority showed no clear political signaling. This indicates that the wave was primarily situated within a politically aligned ecosystem rather than reflecting a broad cross-section of general local users.

**Table B. Posting-style patterns observed across the 41 reviewed accounts**

Posting style category	Description	How to read it
Mostly original posts	Accounts relying primarily on original posts during the wave.	Useful for identifying originators or high-reach accounts.
Mixed original & reposts	Accounts combining original commentary with reposting or quote-posting.	Common among politically active accounts that both frame and reinforce narratives.
Mostly reposts & quote-posts	Accounts primarily reinforcing claims already in circulation.	Useful for identifying spreaders.
Reply-heavy or issue-specific	Accounts whose activity is concentrated in replies or focused on a narrow campaign theme.	Useful for understanding more targeted or interaction-driven participation.
Atypical / technical	Accounts whose behavior differs from the main accusation-amplification pattern.	Relevant for identifying special cases, not for defining the main participation structure.

The posting-style table helps distinguish how different accounts contributed to the wave. Some accounts relied primarily on original posts that shaped or consolidated the accusation, while others contributed mainly through reposting, quote-posting, or repetition after the accusation was already in circulation. This distinction is reflected in the role analysis below, where accounts are grouped by their dominant observable role within the documented wave.

## ACCOUNT ROLES WITHIN THE DOCUMENTED WAVE

**Figure 11. Role classification across the 41 reviewed accounts**




Table C lists the reviewed accounts according to their dominant observable role within the documented wave. These groupings are incident-specific and reflect how each account contributed to the MTV wave: introducing or consolidating the accusation, amplifying its visibility, or extending and reinforcing it once in circulation.

**Table C: Classification of selected accounts**

Sources / originators	Influencers	Spreaders
@allouush	@liZeina	@mahmudeet
@smarterleb	@kahale_tayyar	@imaddankar
@aliimortada	@ShiaphobiaLB	@h_jaber12693
@AbdlhKamh	@safi_mroueh	@dohamoussa59468
@MortadaRoba	@alifawaz_	@chiri_mohamad
	@ghina_ghandour	@aboabbass421148
	@sahar_ghaddar	@maro28424313
	@EbenAlBalad1	@narjesuschrist
	@LibanAyla	@intogreyx
	@Jamalchaiito1	@Alilsmail16092
	@iranin_arabic	@hasan1988313
	@silentpolitics1	@dabbaghmaher8
	@roubahaddad1	@InfoSudLiban
		@NourZahraa78011
		@hyd_ksrr, @Ali__rizk
		@h_mrwa
		@abohadimirza
		@Ktirneked
		@AliBarakat2023
		@Fadi05519425
		@ibrahimjouni10
		@dalalmanso64906

Read together, Figure 10 and Table C point to a layered participation structure rather than a flat or purely spontaneous environment. A smaller number of accounts appear to have played source/originator roles, introducing or consolidating the accusation in its early phase. A larger but still distinct group functioned as influencers, giving the accusation visibility and reach. The largest share of reviewed accounts operated primarily as spreaders, extending and reinforcing claims already in circulation through reposting, quote-posting, and repetition.

### Sources/originators

Within the documented wave, sources/originators are accounts that introduced the accusation or helped consolidate it in its early phase. This is the smallest of the three core role categories, which is analytically relevant in itself: early framing appears concentrated in a limited number of accounts rather than broadly distributed from the outset.

In this case, Ghaleb Ghosn (@smarterleb) and @MortadaRoba are the clearest identifiable examples. Both appear in the pre-midnight phase and contribute to the consolidation of the accusation against MTV at a stage when the narrative is still forming. Accounts such as @AbdlhKamh and @allouush appear shortly after midnight, contributing to the early extension of that framing.

**Figure 12: Examples of source/originator: an early post that helped consolidate the accusation against MTV before it spread more widely across the wave**



## Influencers

Influencers are accounts whose posts drew disproportionate visibility and shaped how the accusation was received and circulated. In this wave, accounts such as @sahar\_ghaddar, @ghina\_ghandour, and @Roubahaddad1 appear in this role to varying degrees. Their significance lies less in being early contributors than in extending the accusation’s reach and reinforcing its political framing.

This distinction matters because visibility within the wave was not evenly distributed. Some accounts contributed far more than others to the circulation and prominence of the accusation, whether through engagement, virality, or their position within a politically aligned network. The influencer category captures this role: accounts that amplified the accusation’s reach and contributed to its broader resonance.

**Figure 13: Examples of influencer role: a high-visibility post that did not originate the accusation, but helped extend its reach and reinforce its political framing**



## Spreaders

Spreaders are accounts whose role was primarily to extend or reinforce claims already in circulation through reposting, repetition, or quote-posting. This is the largest role category in the reviewed set, indicating that the wave relied on a broader layer of participants to sustain and circulate the accusation once it had taken shape.

Accounts such as @imaddankar and @dalalmanso64906 fit this pattern. Their visible contribution occurs after the accusation is already established, and their role consists of extending its reach rather than introducing new framing.

**Figure 14: Examples of a spreader: a post that reinforced an already circulating accusation through repetition or repost-style participation rather than early framing**






Beyond the documented wave, the monitoring also captured signs of network maintenance within the same political-media ecosystem. While this activity falls outside the main escalation window, it remains analytically relevant. In several instances, users called on others to follow or support replacement accounts after suspensions, while higher-visibility accounts promoted smaller, aligned profiles with limited followings.

These patterns suggest that visibility is not only amplified during incident-driven waves, but also reconstituted when aligned accounts are disrupted. One example is @Ktirneked, which, following the suspension of a party-aligned account, promoted a replacement profile created by the same user. The reach of that post indicates that it was further circulated through reposting and amplification.


Figure 15: Additional examples of spreader accounts

The figure displays four social media posts illustrating spreader accounts. The top-left post is from X.com, user @Ktirneked (أحمد النكد), with a post from @Niissriinn (3 days ago) that says: "يا عمي هل بنت كتير مسالمة كيف طار حسابها المهم ادعموها كماالان @Niissriinn". The top-right post is from Twitter, user @Niissriinn, with a post from 9:00 PM on 23/03/2026 that says: "حساب جديد ومكلمين بالكلمة وبالموقف. ما قدرة حظ صورتي بعد بالبروفایل رح حظها لتعرفوني @Niissriinn". The bottom-left post is from Twitter, user @notmimihm (الحساب الثالث M), with a post from 7:55 PM on 23/03/2026 that says: "الحساب الثاني بأسبوع 🙏 الدعم الدعم یرحمکم الله". The bottom-right post is a repost from MaHeR of a post from @AliKnight01 (2 hours ago) that says: "تسکر حسابي الأساسي. ارجو من الأصدقاء متابعة الحساب الجديد والدعم @AliKnight01 مع جزيل الشکر والتقدير". Below this is a profile card for @DarkMatter83245, a university professor, with a bio in Arabic and a photo featuring the Lebanese flag and the text "LEBANON RESISTS" and "#10452KM2".


**10452km²** البجاني   
 @kahale\_tayyar








تغريدة دعم .  
 لائحة بحسابات عندنا تحت الـ 2000 متابع ، الي يتابعهم  
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 الحسابات الي بنفس الوضع ويردوا المتابعة يحطوا تعليق  
 ويتابعوا الي قبلن باللائحة .


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## ESCALATORY AND ATYPICAL CONDUCT

A smaller subset of accounts is notable for displaying clearly observable escalatory conduct within the wave. This should be interpreted conservatively. The count includes only cases where escalation was explicit, such as doxing, violence-oriented language, or direct targeting, and does not capture the broader set of accounts that may have contributed indirectly through amplification.


**Figure 16. Clearly documented escalatory conduct within the reviewed set**

Figure 16 should be read as a minimum count of explicit escalation, not as an exhaustive measure of all aggressive participation in the wave. Accounts such as @hyd\_ksrr, @LibanAyla, and @ibrahimjouni10 fall most clearly within this category.

One account, @Alismaail16092, stands out as atypical. Its visible activity focused largely on coding, it appeared to have a limited network, and it posted—then deleted—a message referencing “F vs MTV,” accompanied by a screenshot resembling a code console, in the context of the cyberattack against MTV that night. The post is notable in light of subsequent local reporting indicating that the MTV hack had been claimed by a group referred to as “the Fatimids” or “Fatimiyoun,” a name later associated with cyberattacks against both the Lebanese Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants.

These observations do not establish coordination or inauthentic behavior. They do indicate that the documented wave was not uniform and included a small number of atypical participants whose conduct differed from the more common accusation-amplification pattern.

Figure 17: Examples of escalatory conduct within the wave: a post that moved beyond accusation and reinforcement into more aggressive targeting



Taken together, the timing, repetition, role distribution, and concentration of politically aligned participation point to a structured pattern of amplification within the documented wave rather than a purely random sequence of interactions. The material reviewed shows a network of politically aligned users circulating similar and often repeated content in a consistent manner.

This does not establish coordination or common control. There is no evidence in this dataset that multiple accounts were operated by a single user. However, the observed patterns are consistent with a form of networked amplification in which a smaller number of visible accounts contribute to early framing or high-reach dissemination, while a broader set of aligned users sustains circulation through repetition and reinforcement.

Similar configurations have been noted in previous monitoring work. These patterns can, in some cases, overlap with coordinated or semi-coordinated behavior, including the involvement of automated or inauthentic accounts.

# CONCLUSION

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The significance of this case lies in the transformation of a controversy over reporting into an environment of deterrence. What began as backlash to a television report did not remain within the register of criticism, dispute, or even aggressive denunciation. In the documented material, it evolved into a campaign in which exposure, threats, and punitive framing combined to raise the cost of journalistic work on a politically sensitive issue.

That shift is the central finding of this report. The issue is not simply that MTV was harshly attacked online, nor only that accusations spread quickly in a polarized wartime setting. The more consequential development is that the backlash created conditions in which media workers could reasonably be made to fear consequences extending beyond reputational damage. Once personal details circulate, intimate material is recirculated for humiliation, and violence is invoked explicitly, the function of the discourse changes, from persuasion to intimidation.

The broader implication is straightforward. In highly polarized and conflict-affected environments, the most important analytical distinction is between criticism and intimidation. That threshold is crossed when hostile discourse is joined by targeted exposure, degrading or compromising material, and threats of physical harm. Recognizing that shift early is essential, because by the time a campaign is publicly understood as a security concern, its deterrent effect may already be well underway.

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