Monday , 01 November 2021
The report is a media monitoring endeavor, as part of a larger project entitled “Inclusive Media, Cohesive Society”, which seeks to trace and combat hate speech while ensuring increased representation of marginalized groups. In the pursuit of a more inclusive and open media sphere, this report is the eighth in a series of studies which aims to monitor segments of problematic speech in various circles of socio-political influence, whether on social media or more traditional means of spreading information. Due to a variety of reasons, including but not restricted to deeply engrained sectarian tendencies and worsening economic hardship, the usage of bigoted and prejudiced rhetoric is recurrently instrumentalized in favor of an exclusionary and “othering” narrative. This reaffirms the necessity for highlighting these instances and bringing them to the fore in order to envision a more promising, ethical, and responsible space for users, producers, and commentators.
Background and Context
Before expanding on the implications of problematic, exclusionary, or incendiary speech directed towards marginalized social groups in the country, it is important that the context is carefully detailed in order to highlight the manner in which these events unfold.
In early August, the commemoration of the 2020 Beirut port explosion was an opportunity not only to pay tribute to the victims of this disaster, but also to point out the lack of an official comprehensive reparation. In fact, the last bill of Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) MP George Atallah, which excludes foreign victims from the compensation approved by Parliament, shows that powerful Lebanese political players are unwilling to support foreign residents affected by the blast. Al-Akhbar newspaper reported the exclusion of non-Lebanese people from the state's compensation, while the Anti-Racism Movement created a data collection of victims absent from the official list.
In addition to not having the status of victims linked to the Beirut port explosion, some marginalized foreign groups are also subject to various pressures in the neighborhoods affected by the tragic event. In this context, The Public Source described the rise of sectarian, clientelist networks, threats of deportation, and permanent displacement of refugees due to their fragile legal status. At the same time, other communities such as Sudanese, Iraqi, Yemeni, and Somali refugees are left out in the cold due to the lack of an adequate humanitarian aid system.
Migrant workers are also suffering from the consequences of the economic crisis without any official support. In a context where most people belonging to this community in Lebanon have lost their jobs and are now unable to make ends meet, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has warned that more than half of migrant workers need urgent humanitarian assistance to survive. The precariousness in which they now live, coupled with the shock of the Beirut port explosion, could explain why they are going through a double trauma.
While the relevance of a media report or international organizations’ statements denouncing exclusion and racism towards marginalized groups must be highlighted, it should be noted that they remain a minority voice. On the contrary, mainstream media remains shaped mainly by hate, which eventually turns into racist campaigns or status quo. Thus, when Army Intelligence is accused of being complicit in working with the Assad regime by capturing Syrians in front of the Syrian Embassy, it is not surprising that only a small minority of media is outraged by this type of practice.
This report confirms how the different marginalized communities find themselves particularly isolated in a context of trauma in the aftermath of the explosion of the Beirut port and a worsening economic situation. The lack of support for those marginalized communities, coupled with the hate speech surrounding them, make the situation in which they live all the more precarious and alarming.
Methodology
The methods used to locate, collect, and analyze the data pursued in this study entail a classification based on the three types of platforms examined: Facebook, Twitter, and national television. Moreover, it is crucial to clarify that our study on Facebook specifically monitors problematic speech directed towards one marginalized group per month, i.e., migrant workers in August 2021. This does not apply to the selection process pursued with Twitter and national television; in both cases, all instances of problematic/hate speech were targeted. Although the manner in which such speech is defined may vary, a flexible umbrella constituting irresponsible reporting, exaggerations, generalizations, incitement, and exclusionary rhetoric is adapted for our purposes.
Traditional Media
For national television, or traditional media, the first step was to tackle all the stories related to marginalized groups (women/gender equality, people with disabilities, LGBTQ+ community, refugees/IDPs, migrant workers, and religious/racial denominations) in the media outlets of choice, to see if they are equally represented or overlooked by the media. The second step was to monitor the number of hate speech cases regarding marginalized groups, while taking into consideration the behavior of the host and the guest towards hate speech.
The content study monitored the main news bulletin and the content of prime-time talk shows on seven Lebanese channels in the period from August 1 to 7, 2021. Only the first seven days of each month will be monitored.
The media outlet covered in the study are:
A total of 857 items monitored during this period were entered in a database, where one story was identified related to marginalized groups, which included the following information:
On the second week of the month, i.e., from August 8 to 12, 2021, the top daily hashtags are monitored at precisely 10 am. In addition, a timeframe of 9:45 am to 10:15 am was chosen, where the top hashtags in Lebanon are monitored. Only the hashtags that were used in tweets of problematic rhetoric will be displayed.
Simultaneously, any tweets found outside this timeframe displaying such rhetoric will be taken note of and an analysis of Twitter as a whole will be conducted. The purpose is to better understand what makes this type of harmful discourse trending. This report also briefly assesses the topics covered, the profiles of the instigators, as well as the potential networks spreading the hashtags and/or tweets. Screenshots may be added when obtainable as well to further demonstrate trends, if necessary. To add another dimension to this study, we look at whether marginalized groups (Women, Refugees, LGBTQ, etc.) are included within the conversation or entirely excluded.
While this report covers the period between August 8 to 12, 2021 (dates included), some of the literature below may include updates from the following days (August 13 to 14, 2021) to add relevance and gain further insights from the monitored trends.
In this particular case, the methodology pursued does not differ from the ones utilized in the previous months, when the first and second Facebook hate speech reports on refugees were released. While conclusive items from the terms shown below cannot be demonstrated immediately, the method we have utilized is keeping count of accessible posts & comments which discuss refugees in any way on several pages of political parties, newspapers, news stations, news sites, and civil society organizations, alongside posts which may include problematic, exclusive, or bigoted speech directed towards the fleeing community. Although the attitudes in which such a discourse is defined may vary ("physical incitement" or "biogted reporting"), a flexible broader conception constituting irresponsible reporting, exaggerations, generalizations, incitement, and exclusivity is utilized in this study.
In total, 37 pages were examined via the Facebook search engine too; all in all, 24 reachable posts and comments tackled refugees and their needs and/or desires, and 14 of them constituted problematic speech. The following keywords were used to locate the posts under study:
As for the time interval in which this information was collected, it strictly included posts and comments made between August 15 to 22, 2021. This interval also represents the range of the context elaborated and described in the first section.
The main topics of news bulletin and the content of prime-time talk shows during the monitoring period of seven Lebanese channels: Al-Manar, OTV, NBN, LBCI, MTV, Al Jadeed, and Télé Liban (TL) were divided into two categories:
As a result of the above, topics related to marginalized groups (women/gender equality, people with disabilities, LGBT community, refugees/IDPs, and other marginalized groups) significantly decreased this month, indicating that these groups were overlooked in the Lebanese media.
During the monitoring period:
The news bulletins recorded 857 stories, where only one story was identified related to marginalized groups:
The prime-time talk shows recorded 23 sections, one of them was identified as related to marginalized groups (people with disabilities), as shown in figure 3. This story shed light on protesters who were injured during their participation in the demonstrations in Beirut after August 4, 2020, in which their injuries led to disabilities The main topics of discussion in all the programs tackled the first anniversary of the Beirut port explosion on August 4, 2020, the progress that Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati is achieving, and the challenges toward forming a cabinet in Lebanon.
The seven prime time talk shows monitored: It's about time (MTV), And now what (New), Twenty30 (LBCI), Lebanon Today (TL), Today's Discussion (OTV), Talk of the hour (Al-Manar), and The Fourth Estate (NBN).
It is worth mentioning that stories on LGBTQ+ were overlooked entirely in both news bulletins and in prime time talk shows that were monitored.
This month no hate speech or problematic content was identified in both news bulletins and prime time talk shows.
The nature of Twitter, and the methodology detailed earlier for extracting data from this platform, allow for a more panoptic view of the subjects pertaining to Lebanese society and daily life. With a turbulent context of political violence, bullying, and harassment dominating the public debate, Twitter unravels the daily anxieties attitudes of the population’s response. This report covers the period between August 8 to 12, 2021 (dates included); some of the literature below may include updates from the following days: August 13 to 14, 2021, to add relevance and gain further insights from the monitored trend.
Hashtags and statistics
The month began with the release of data collected by the Anti-Racism Movement (ARM) Lebanon as they compiled a loss of over 70 victims of the Beirut Port explosion. Most of them were excluded from the official list of victims as they were from marginalized foreign groups. By the second week of August, there was no sign or discussions on Twitter concerning such discrimination.
In addition, two note-worthy critical incidents were marked by the involvement of the Lebanese Forces (LF) In the first, one of the relatives of the port explosion saw that Lebanese Forces (LF) supporters were heading to a protest location with their party flags in hand. He requested that they discard them as the LF party was part of the governments whose negligence caused the blast. Things escalated as the LF supporters saw that he was wearing a keffiyeh scarf, a symbol of Palestinian militant activism, associated by LF to the years of violent Palestinian involvement in the Lebanese civil war. LF supporters assaulted the man and severely wounded him. In another incident, LF supporters clashed with a group of protesters near the former’s office in Gemmayzeh. A bloodied protester had to resort to pleading by telling them that he is Christian, to no avail. He was filmed while being forced to discard the keffiyeh he was wearing and step on it. The protest included members of the Communist Party. In trying to justify the actions of his supporters, LF leader Samir Geagea stated (Img. 1) that the Communists started the clash by throwing Molotov cocktails at an LF office.
While there was much criticism online for the incidents, the LF maintained wide support. In the screenshot below, the metrics alone speak for themselves. To make matters worse, one tweet (Img. 1 – author: Denis) remains particularly disturbing as it calls for another "Black Saturday," an incident where hundreds of Muslims were killed at the hands of the Phalangists (Kataeb Party) during the Civil War.
The tweets in Img. 1 were not included in the charts as they were not within the monitoring period. However, it is essential to highlight such incidents as they give a more holistic perspective.
Img. 1: tweets supporting the actions of Lebanese Forces on August 4 – one tweet by Denis calls for another massacre.
On the other hand, Hezbollah supporters remained active this month as tweets were primarily directed at the Maronite Patriarch, criticizing his stance on Israel and labeling him as a "foreign agent." Img. 2 showcases a tweet where the author calls the Patriarch the enemy. Another author in Img. 3 attacks a journalist who spoke out against Hezbollahj by calling him mentally disabled, using the mentally ill as an insult, and propagating the stigma against them.
Img. 2: tweet labeling the Christian Maronite Patriarch as the enemy.
Img. 3: tweets calling a journalist mentally disabled/retarded as an insult.
Also, a couple of tweets by authors, whose political affiliations remain unclear, targeted homosexuals. One of them used the word "homosexual" as an insult, and even though the author removed it, we managed to record the text in our database.
Finally, in an unusual twist, after years of unpaid work and house confinement in conditions that could only be described as slavery, Nepalese domestic worker Sajita Lama was freed from her captors. It was due to the consistent efforts of the online local and international community. Sajita was still not paid her fees for the last 110 months, but the activists supporting her stated that they are following up on the matter. Furthermore, while no trending hashtag was monitored, there is a reason to believe that the campaigns were far more active on other social media platforms.
August was filled to the brim with one disaster. The month saw multiple explosions due to fuel hoarding, namely one incident in Akkar. The other highlights are the overcrowded hospitals, blatant impunity alongside the rampant human rights abuses, and finally, the looming collapse of all institutions. Most Lebanese have struggled to simply process their realities, which has made it more difficult for many to think of anyone who is not in their immediate vicinity or close circle. This is something to consider when looking back at this brutal month, its effect on the Lebanese psyche, and attempting to understand what sets trends on Twitter within Lebanon.
Hate Speech on Facebook
Given the socio-economic crisis in the country and the massive reduction in real wages amongst the vast majority of Lebanon's residents, services previously ensured by the dollar peg are scarcely available today. It includes but is not restricted to employing migrants as domestic workers. As mentioned in our previous Facebook report tackling hate speech targeting migrant workers, this overwhelming structural change in the country has paved the way for noticeably less content and coverage on the daily status and restrictions faced by migrants. Given this transformation, certain events which have taken place in the past few weeks are noteworthy.
First and foremost, it is crucial to take into account that this transformation does not necessarily mean that migrant workers are absent from the economy. Instead, there is a potential shift in their socio-economic positionality, with many resorting to gas stations to sustain their presence. Meanwhile, in the domestic sphere within the household, migrants are replaced by Lebanese citizens for a cheaper wage (given that they are not expecting fresh cash), transferring such sexist-exploitive mechanisms to the local arena as opposed to outsourcing the work to migrants.
In addition, the deteriorating security crisis in the country has further allowed for either intensified control on the movement of migrants and foreigners or depriving them of essential protection and aid. It is exemplified by the fact that little-to-no protection and compensation were provided by the state to the victims following the Beirut blast of August 4. Despite this, a member of parliament from FPM has proposed a law that was meant to exclude non-Lebanese from any potential compensation package. Furthermore, under the pretext of security developments in certain regions like Zgharta, the Municipality of Zgharta-Ehden enforced a curfew on foreign and migrant workers in early July, taking into account the xenophobic reporting and "fears" of Lebanese residents.
In order to concisely wrap up and visualize the data garnered, some charts and graphs are found below. It is crucial to take into account that indications stemming from this data cannot be taken as conclusive or final due to the limited range in which this is being examined, alongside other variables that may reinforce bias.
Comparative indicators and insights
Problematic speech targeting refugees spans a variety of domains within this study, including but not restricted to populist criticism targeting politicians who supposedly "cater" to refugees, interpretations that link refugees (as a political force) to geopolitical alignments, and state and party-led requests to fasten the return of refugees. These illustrations demonstrate the potential for the development of problematic or hate speech targeting refugees taking into account the deteriorating economic context and the populist anti-establishment discourse being co-opted by a discriminatory discourse.
On the level of the platforms and media outlets targeting these thematic distinctions, Facebook pages of newspapers hold the most considerable portion of posts tackling refugees. It is an interesting comparative observation given that the last refugee report in April shows that newspapers' pages did not address or host comments on refugees at all. Meanwhile, similar to previous reports on refugees, the Facebook pages of right-wing Christian-majority parties make up the majority of problematic posts amongst political party platforms. On the other hand, while news sites contained the vast majority of both alarming and total number of posts in the last refugee report, the distribution is far more pluralistic and diverse for August.
One important note to consider is that there is an immense decrease in the number of total posts and comments (24) compared to the number presented in the April report (233). While one may hypothesize that this is majorly reflected in how refugees are no longer becoming a topic of contested discussion, given the socio-economic deteriorations which have recently taken place, there is also a coincidental factor considering that little-to-no interactive posts on this topic were laid out by the Facebook pages of news sites and television stations. On the contrary, a good deal of the content available provides a "neutral" reporting lens (ex: posts/comments concerning the relationship between refugees and Assad revival, distribution of resources in Lebanon to refugee camps), which does not open the window for contestation or debate.
Conclusion
While the commemoration of the Beirut bombing could have been a moment of crucial dialogue and accountability, Lebanese authorities fells short. As the country sinks deeper into crisis, marginalized communities continue to be increasingly isolated and victims of different hate speech campaigns. The demonization of marginalized communities can thus be understood as a strategy to divert attention from Lebanon's deeper problems, which would require holding the political authorities accountable.
In the absence of a sufficiently strong counter-discourse, incidents multiply, allowing suppressed hatreds to come to light and be normalized. For example, after clashes between residents of the town of Kawkaba and Syrian residents, some 900 Syrian refugees were evicted from their homes without any relevant media outrage. This type of incident, which is becoming increasingly frequent, confirms that marginalized communities are completely left behind in situations of intense crisis and without the support of official institutions or the media.
In this context, online violence and incidents become systemic practices that transform and structure society. Racism against refugees and migrant workers, homophobia, discrimination against people with disabilities have become common and normalized practices. This month, Raseef 22 highlighted the systematization of misogynistic practices against women. Maya Al-Ammar described how the number of complaints related to cyber sexual violence had increased considerably in a few years, as well as personal experiences of harassment.
As the violence against marginalized communities is becoming increasingly normalized, and where the Lebanese authorities ignore or even instigate these practices, there is a need to promote a counter-discourse. Developing a more inclusive media landscape that gives voice to marginalized communities and systematically suppressing hate speech and other violence are cornerstones of developing an online environment free from hatred and violence.