Saturday , 06 September 2025
In cooperation with the Center for Law and Democracy, the Samir Kassir Foundation is evaluating some of the most prominent Lebanese judicial rulings related to issues of freedom of opinion, expression, and the press, from the perspective of international law and best practices. Some of these verdicts were in favor of enhancing freedoms, while others contributed to restricting freedoms and rights. The following is the fifth case study, on the ruling issued in favor of LBCI’s “Marhaba Dawle” show on Thursday, 24 January 2024, in the case brought against it by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities.
Facts
“Marhaba Dawle” is a satirical comedy show aired by the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI) which uses comedy to highlight challenges facing society in Lebanon, including in relation to the Internal Security Forces (ISF). Following the airing of the first show on 18 January 2024, and just before the second show, scheduled to be aired a week later, on 24 January 2024, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) brought an urgent action before the Interim Relief Judge in Beirut asking for an ex parte order (i.e., one in which the other side is not necessarily represented) to prohibit future airings of the show entirely (i.e., effectively to cancel the show via a legal decision).
The MoIM based its case on Article 604 of the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, in conjunction with Articles 589 and 593 of the Code. It argued that freedom of expression is not absolute and that it must be limited to protect reputation and dignity, “especially if this pertains to a military institution which depends on morale in particular to perform its tasks,” and that the 18 January show “contained several insults to the dignity of the State and the prestige of the Internal Security Forces in particular.” The MoIM claimed that the show demoralised the ISF and also violated “moral and ethical” rules pertaining to the media. It also claimed that the use of military uniforms and vehicles similar to those used by the ISF violated criminal rules. Finally, it added that advertisements relating to the upcoming 25 January show demonstrated that it would again “include several insults against the Internal Security Forces, the spirit of the institution and its members as well as the reputation of the State and its position among its citizens.” This “imminent danger and extreme urgency call for an ex parte order that should aim at stopping the broadcast of the aforementioned show by any means.”
The defendant media outlet presented several defences. First, it argued that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as it failed to meet the conditions of Articles 579 and 589 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in particular inasmuch as the infringement claimed by the plaintiff was a mere possibility and had not been proven, while the jurisdiction of the Interim Relief Court is limited to addressing proven, ongoing violations of rights. Second, “Marhaba Dawle” was a comedy show, intended to bring “joy” to Lebanese citizens “by helping them tolerate their painful reality and shedding light on several aspects of their society, of which the Internal Security Forces are a part.” As such, it never intended to defame the Lebanese State or to demoralise the ISF, as shown by the tone and style of the show. Third, a complete ban on a television show would represent a breach of the right to freedom of expression because it would go beyond preventing a specific harm and prevent any future episode from being aired, as a form of prior censorship. This measure also fell outside the powers of the Interim Relief Court. Instead, it was the duty of that Court to protect freedom of expression, which was a freedom “upon which Lebanon is based and which characterize its identity.” The fact that there was an ongoing criminal complaint relating to the same matter also took this case outside of the jurisdiction of the Interim Relief Court.
The case was heard by Judge Carla Shawah, sitting as Interim Relief Judge in Beirut, and the decision was issued at her home on 25 January 2024 at 8:00pm.
Decision
The Court started out by recognising that “Marhaba Dawle” was a comedy show which was intended to entertain, inform and provide relief (“escape”) to the public. It went on to note that freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, guaranteed in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[1] and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,[2] to which Lebanon had acceded in 1972, as well as other international conventions. This right was also reflected in various provisions in the preamble to the Lebanese Constitution – including paragraph (c), setting out the democratic and freedom respecting nature of Lebanon, and paragraph (b), noting that Lebanon was a founding member of the United Nations and committed to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – and also guaranteed by Article 13 of the Constitution.
The Court then articulated several key attributes of freedom of expression, as well as the media’s key role in making that right a reality. It noted that this applied to media content “whether through serious or important news broadcasts or through other forms of entertainment media” and set out the media’s “right to freely transmit ideas and exercise free speech for the benefit of its viewers and the public.”
It went on to note that “categorically preventing” a media outlet from disseminating content “violates the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in international conventions and treaties and the Lebanese Constitution.” This was also a denial of “the public’s right to receive information and to know about artists’ works and ideas.” These rights “outweigh any right the plaintiff has in this context,” and this was particularly the case since the show was intended to “entertain the public and to portray the bitter reality of people in a humorous and sarcastic manner, and not to defame the plaintiff nor to deliberately tarnish its reputation.”
The Court also noted that the absolute ban the plaintiff was seeking was outside of the powers of the Interim Relief Court, since it constituted a “binding system-based decision,” which would violate Article 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which rules out such decisions. In addition, it was not the role of that Court to decide criminal matters but, ultimately, the role of the criminal courts (which remedy the plaintiff was free to pursue). The Court also noted that it was not open to it to speculate as to what might appear in the second episode, or to decide that the plaintiff “would be exposed to an imminent and certain risk that can only be avoided by issuing a prior ban on” the show. The Court also suggested that “any prior censorship of the media product… has no legal basis in the enforced Lebanese laws, rather, it undermines the essence of media freedom.” The relief sought by the plaintiff was, instead, a form of retaliation against the defendant which the Court was not entitled to impose.
As a result, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s petition in its entirety.
Analysis
As a first point, it is positive that the Court referred to constitutional and international guarantees for freedom of expression in its decision, a point it referred to at least one time in the substance of the decision (referring to the idea of preventing a media outlet from disseminating content in advance). The Court also made numerous helpful references to the importance of freedom of expression generally and specifically in the context of Lebanon – including through its quoting of some of the preambular paragraphs of the Lebanese Constitution – as well as of the important role of the media in giving effect to freedom of expression. These references essentially set the wider tone for the decision. It was particularly insightful of the Court to refer to both the right of the media to disseminate the content in question and the right of the public to receive it. This dual nature of the right, protecting both speakers and listeners, is fully supported by international law – with the guarantee of freedom of expression referring to the rights to “seek” and “receive,” as well as “impart” information and ideas – and yet is rarely stated explicitly in national decisions.
In terms of the substance of the decision, this was divided among procedural issues – such as that the Interim Relief Court did not have the power to issue a ban of this nature – and more substantive issues. We will focus here on the latter since we are not experts in Lebanese procedural law.
In terms of substance, the gist of the decision is that the right to freedom of expression in this case outweighs any claim about harm to the Internal Security Forces, whether arising from the known content of the 18 January show or speculation about what might be in the 25 January show. Although we have not seen the 18 January show, and there was little in the decision about its content, other than generalities about the style of the show, this seems obviously to be correct. It is difficult to imagine how a comedy could possibly create a risk of the harms alleged by the MoIM. And some of the specific allegations – such as about uniforms and look-alike vehicles – are routinely found in comedies and other media content around the world, without anyone ever suggesting that this might cause any harm.
The Court also took a very strong position on the particular sanction sought by the plaintiff, namely a complete ban on future episodes of the show, a form of prior censorship, as the Court noted. It indicated that this was outside its powers, as an Interim Relief Court, but also suggested that prior censorship of the media had no basis at all in Lebanese law. International law is very suspicious of any form of prior censorship, as the following quote from a decision of the European Court of Human Rights makes clear:
[T]he Court has emphasised that while Article 10 does not prohibit the imposition of prior restraints on publication, the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court. This is especially so as far as the press is concerned, for news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest.[3]
While the Court does not entirely rule out prior censorship of the media, it almost goes that far and commentators have often suggested that that is never legitimate.
The Court did not address the fact that the MoIM had asked for an ex parte decision. This may have been because the LBCI was able to appear and so perhaps it did not seem that relevant. However, it could be seen as an abuse of process even to ask for such a decision when it would clearly not be a challenge to serve notice of the proceeding on a large, well-estasblished entity like LBCI. In other words, there was simply no need for MoIM to ask for an ex parte decision and the Court might have made that clear.
Although there can be no doubt that the Court reached the right decision in this case, it would, at the same time, have been useful if the Court had deconstructed the arguments of the MoIM a bit more precisely. There were, from the perspective of international law, three key flaws in these arguments.
First, a key thrust of the MoIM position was that the show defamed the ISF, as well as the State of Lebanon. It is well established under international law that public bodies, as such, do not have reputations which they can defend legally. Thus, in their 2000 Joint Declaration, the (then three) special international mandates on freedom of expression – the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression – stated:
At a minimum, defamation laws should comply with the following standards:…
At a minimum, the Court could have pointed out explicitly – although it was already somehow implicit in the decision – that the allegations of defamation, even as regards the (known) 18 January show, were unfounded, which was presumably the case.
A second key thrust of the MoIM position was that the show undermined the morale of the members of the ISF, who “are making their utmost efforts and sacrifices to preserve citizens’ security and dignity, despite their well-known exhausting living conditions.” While protection of national security is recognised as a ground for restricting freedom of expression, no international court has ever accepted an argument justifying such a restriction merely on the grounds of protecting the morale of soldiers. This is simply too vague and speculative to justify such a restriction. Put differently, it would be possible to present this rationale any time a public authority was criticised. A restriction on freedom of expression, to be justified on national security grounds, must show a direct causal link between the expression in question and the threat to national security. A risk of undermining morale simply does not meet this standard.
Third, the MoIM suggested that the behaviour of the LBCI in airing the show violated “moral and ethical” media standards. It is not clear from the decision what specific standards, if any, the LBCI was supposed to have violated. Inasmuch as this was just a general allegation, the Court could have indicated that it could only consider specific allegations of a breach of rules and, likely, for the Interim Relief Court, a breach which led to direct and ongoing harm. But a wider point here is that courts are not supposed to sanction media outlets for breach of media standards. The role of courts is, obviously, limited to addressing breaches of the law. It might have been helpful for the Court to have clarified that.
Post Script
The show continues to be shown in Lebanon.
[1] UN General Assembly Resolution 217A(III), 10 December 1948, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.
[2] UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights.
[3] Mosley v. the United Kingdom, 10 May 2011, Application No. 48009/08, para. 117.
[4] Adopted 30 November 2000, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/b/40190.pdf.
This report was made possible thanks to the support of: