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SKeyes Center for Media and Cultural Freedom - Samir Kassir Foundation

Targeting Hicham Haddad: Online Incitement Amid Lebanon's War Narratives

Source InflueAnswers
Thursday , 26 December 2024

I. Context


On November 5, 2024, Lebanese media personality Hicham Haddad posed a critical question in a viral social media video: “Are we winning the war? Or have we won the war?”


The video, which garnered half a million views on Instagram, emerged amid escalating pro-axis[1] victory rhetoric on social media and in the context of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, 22 days before the ceasefire was announced. The conflict had led to relentless bombings across the country, targeting Beirut’s southern suburbs, areas inside the capital, the South, the Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, and the North. Haddad’s remarks ignited sharp divisions in public opinion:

  • Pro-axis groups reacted with hostility, launching campaigns of incitement and criticism.
  • Anti-axis groups welcomed his remarks with approval.
  • A few neutral voices engaged with Haddad’s question analytically, avoiding the polarizing discourse.

Compounding the controversy, Israeli social media pages picked up the video, leveraging it as part of Israel’s documented online strategy – a subject explored in a previous report.


Figure 1: Israeli accounts re-post Hicham Haddad’s video


The backlash against Haddad escalated into a campaign of incitement and even death threats. Haddad publicly expressed fear for his safety, stating that he felt threatened and hesitant to return to Lebanon – a concern rooted in alarming precedents: the assassination of writer and activist Lokman Slim, the assaults on journalists
Nabil Mamlouk, Daoud Rammal, and Rami Naim, as well as the smear campaign targeting Mariam Majdouline Lahham.


This report analyzes the public discourse surrounding Haddad’s video, identifies dangerous statements, and investigates their origins and intentions.

II. Methodology


The analysis focuses on conversations on X (formerly Twitter). Using data scraping techniques, all tweets containing the keyword "هشام حداد" were collected from November 5 to November 15, 2024.


The data was categorized thematically, and each tweet was tagged by sentiment:

  • Positive sentiment: Support or praise for Haddad’s statements.
  • Negative sentiment: Smearing, incitement, or hostile remarks.
  • Neutral sentiment: Tweets from news outlets or users sharing information without personal opinions.

A deep profile analysis of the sources behind inciting and dangerous tweets was conducted to identify patterns and triggers fueling the discourse.

 

III. Analysis


After filtering out hashtag aggregators (irrelevant tweets using the hashtag to gain visibility), the final dataset comprised 865 tweets:

  • 122 tweets were positive.
  • 687 tweets were negative.
  • 56 tweets were neutral.


Sentiment Breakdown by Theme:

  • Positive Themes:
    1. Praise, solidarity, or defense of Haddad.
    2. Positive quoting of Haddad’s statement.
  • Negative Themes:
    1. Smearing Haddad.
    2. Redefining “defeat” to contradict Haddad’s narrative.
    3. Inciting hostility.
    4. Reiterating ideological talking points
    5. Negative quoting of Haddad’s statement.
  • Neutral Themes:
    • News reporting.
    • Quoting Haddad without personal commentary


Cross-Platform Migration

  • The video was originally posted on Instagram and quickly migrated to X before Beirut Times—the video’s owner—published it on November 6.
  • Beirut Times' post garnered 2k views, far fewer than the virality achieved on Twitter.
  • The @Da2ee2 account, a pro-Hezbollah avatar, was the first to publish the video on a mass scale, driving its virality to 668k views. Numerous users downloaded the video (retaining its watermark) and reshared it, amplifying its impact.



Figure 2: Pro-Hezbollah account makes the video viral

User-Generated Content

  • A total of 18 original videos were produced by online content creators in direct response to Haddad’s statements. These videos showcased a diverse range of perspectives and reactions, further amplifying the discourse and contributing to the broader conversation surrounding Haddad's remarks.


Figure 3: Pro-Hezbollah journalist Pierre Abi-Saab, among others, responds to Haddad

  • Many seized the opportunity to attack anti-axis figures, adding them to an established list of individuals and institutions frequently targeted by smear campaigns. This list includes, among others, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, Maronite Patriarch Beshara al-Rai, basket-ball player Wael Arakji, journalists Nancy Lakkis, Mariam Majdouline Lahham, Rami Naim, Marcel Ghanem, Dima Sadek, Faisal Qassem, Nadim Qoteish, Layal Elekhtyar, Tony Boulos, Tony Abi Najem, Joyce Hanna, Mohammad Barakat, Mouafac Harb, Ali al-Amine, and Hadi Mourad, political commentators Saleh Machnouk, Joseph Abou Fadel, and Makram Rabah, MP Samy Gemayel, former MPs Fares Souaid and Wehbi Katicha, judge Peter Germanos, singer Elissa, scholar Mona Fayyad, as well as the US Embassy, MTV, pro-Syrian Revolution figures, and Emirati business tycoon Khalaf Alhabtoor.

Comparative Analysis: Organic or Orchestrated?

We examined three cases: Hisham Haddad, Ghassan Saoud, and Saleh Mashnouk.


To explore whether the backlash on Hicham Haddad was organic or orchestrated, we analyzed two other cases of prominent political commentators: Ghassan Saoud and Saleh Machnouk.

  1. Ghassan Saoud (Hezbollah-aligned media personality):
    • Saoud echoed similar arguments to Haddad in a 27-minute segment on a pro-Hezbollah YouTube channel (November 13).
    • An excerpt of the video, posted by Saoud on November 15, garnered 9,500 views.
    • Journalist Rami Naim shared the same excerpt a day earlier, reaching 93,000 views.
    • Notably, no smear campaign was directed at Saoud despite the parallels to Haddad’s content.
  2. Saleh Machnouk:
    • Machnouk, a prominent Hezbollah critic active primarily on Instagram, consistently produces viral content.
    • His videos peaked at 6 million views (September 26), with over 47,000 shares.
    • Despite content migration on his content to X (reaching 300,000+ views), no organized smear campaign was observed.
    • Minority pro-Hezbollah comments originated from avatars (created in 2024 with minimal followings) that displayed non-automated behavior, indicating activity from real individuals behind screens rather than bots.

For background, Hicham Haddad, once a supporter of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), shifted to anti-Hezbollah position during the 2019 uprising. This shift made him a frequent target of FPM-aligned electronic avatar armies. Haddad’s broad appeal across diverse political audiences likely contributed to the significant response his video received.


Observations and Triggers

The virality of Haddad’s video can be attributed to two factors:

  • Timing: The video was released during a period of military setbacks and mounting political pressure on Hezbollah to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1559, which were seen as critical to ending the war.
  • Narrative Opportunity: Pro-axis supporters seized the moment to redefine “defeat” and victory” in the absence of clear leadership, after Israel killed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, amplifying the video’s impact.

IV. Account Analysis

Anonymity and Account Types

  • Out of 81 accounts inciting against Haddad, only 14 had real profile pictures and names.
  • The majority were anonymous avatars, a common tactic that enables aggressive and unfiltered hate speech without accountability.

 


Figure 4: Example of avatars involved in attacking Haddad

Activity Levels and Longevity

The accounts involved in the discourse display varying levels of activity and longevity, indicating a mix of long-standing and newly created profiles: Old accounts (established in 2011, 2012) suggest sustained engagement from established users; and newer accounts (created in 2023, 2024) point to possible recent mobilization efforts, either organic or orchestrated.


Volume of Posts
  1. The majority of accounts examined demonstrate normal engagement indicating human behavior. However 3 accounts stood out as media aggregators: @alislim124: 125,700 posts (active since 2012). Frequency of 28.6 posts per day (mostly retweets)
  2. @geymanya: 26,400 posts (active since 2022). Frequency (36 posts per day (mostly retweets)

Figure 5: Top 3 accounts with larger number of posts

 

Deleted or Suspended Accounts

Some accounts were suspended or deleted, likely due to platform enforcement of policies against violations such as hate speech.


The deletion of accounts – an occurrence noted in previous studies – suggests an awareness among users of their digital footprint. This behavior indicates a deliberate strategy to evade detection, with users frequently creating new accounts to sustain or launch new campaigns.



Figure 6: Example of suspended or deleted accounts

 

Geographical Indicators

More than half of the accounts had not entered their geolocation as it remains voluntary and it’s often used to deliver a message rather than indicate the real location. “Planet earth’ or “Ya Zahraa Madad-يا زهراء مدد”  or even “Next to Nasrallah” were some of the location inserted.  Several accounts claimed connections with countries such as Syria (6 accounts), Yemen (6 accounts, , Iraq (6 accounts), Jordan (2 accounts), Iran (1 account), and Palestine (4 accounts), Algeria (2 accounts), Morocco (2 accounts), UAE (4 accounts), Qatar (2 accounts), UK (4 accounts), France (4 accounts), and other countries, indicating  cross country virality.



Figure 7: Foreign accounts join the campaign

Electronic Army or Human Accounts?

The Majority of the accounts showed no sign of autonomous behavior indicating real human tweets as opposed to a conventual bot army.


V. Narrative Analysis

Incitement and Accusation of Treachery

This theme is characterized by highly charged rhetoric targeting Hicham Haddad and others, framing him as a traitor and a Zionist. The accusations range from direct insults to threats of future punishment.


Key observations:

  1. Language of Betrayal:
    • Repeated accusations of treason (e.g., “traitors,” “collaborators with the Israelis”)
    • References to historical betrayals, such as Maronite alignment with Israel during the civil war.
  1. Dehumanization and Vilification:
    • Haddad is repeatedly discredited and described in derogatory terms such as "clown," and "cheap." These terms aim to diminish his legitimacy in the eyes of the audience.
    • Statements like "Haddad sold his tongue, conscience, honor, and mind for money" frame him as morally and ethically corruption, undermining trust in his character.
  1. Threats and Punishment:
    • Explicit mentions of future repercussions once the war is over, suggesting exile, imprisonment, violence, or worse (e.g., "we’ll deal with every traitor," "purification is coming").
    • The use of collective pronouns like “we” frames these threats as societal consensus rather than isolated opinions.
  1. Polarization:
    • Haddad’s critics emphasize a binary of loyalty versus betrayal, using Haddad as a foil to highlight their own or their group’s perceived patriotism and resistance.

Examples:
  • "By your life, Rami Naim, your fate will be like that of Hisham Haddad and Dima Sadek: exile! You won’t escape the grip of 1.5 million Shia once the war is over."
  • "This is not the time. Later, he and others like him will have their reckoning. Once the war ends, we’ll deal with every traitor as necessary."
  • "Damn Hisham Haddad and people like him. Don’t worry; purification is coming."
  • "The best thing we can do these days is get rid of cowards, traitors, and those who spread despair and fear, like Hisham Haddad."

Redefining Winning

This theme seeks to construct an alternative framework for interpreting victory and defeat, directly challenging Hisham Haddad’s narrative. Historical, ideological, and religious arguments are employed to redefine what constitutes victory. Key observations:

  1. Ideological Rhetoric:
    • Victory is framed as ideological and existential persistence, not material gains or short-term outcomes, irrespective of physical losses or setbacks.
    • Religious and historical references, such as those to Hussein and Ali bin Abi Talib, are invoked to justify a divine struggle and to equate resistance with triumph.
  1. Denial of Defeat:
    • Defeat is presented as a failure of principles or submission to adversaries, not military or political setbacks.
    • Explicit rejection of defeat is tied to religious faith (e.g., "Defeat is a word that has been erased from our dictionary") and a belief in eventual victory.
    • Statements like “Defeat is when we kneel to your American masters” emphasize ideological steadfastness.
  1. Historical Comparisons:
    • Prolonged struggles in Algeria or Vietnam, among others, are cited to highlight perseverance as the true marker of victory, rather than immediate outcomes.
  1. Personal Attacks:
    • Haddad is dismissed with affronts such as "clown" and "idiot" to discredit his authority.
    • Assertions of opportunism ("he buys and sells") are used to juxtapose his alleged dishonor with the purported moral superiority of the resistance.
  1. Group Identity and Sacrifice:
    • Phrases like “Our heads are sacrifices for Hussein” emphasize readiness for sacrifice as intrinsic to the resistance’s definition of victory.
    • Haddad’s views are presented as incompatible with the resistance supporters’ ideological ethos.

Examples:

  • “Our heads are sacrifices for Hussein—this is our belief, something low-lives like #Hisham_Haddad and his ilk will never understand”
  • "We do not lose because God has promised us victory, and we believe Him. Defeat is a word that has been erased from our dictionary."
  • "Two concepts that differ among nations. There are people who surrender after the first slap, and there are people who do not give up or get defeated—even if an entire generation is wiped out, another generation will be born to carry on the journey. "
  • "We will never be defeated. The dictionary of Ali ibn Abi Talib (AS) and the men of Ali ibn Abi Talib (AS) does not contain the word "defeat" or "to be defeated." Yes, they are defeated. We defeat them—nothing more to it, Hicham Haddad."

VI. Summary

The recent online campaign targeting Hicham Haddad reflects a broader, recurring trend in Lebanon, where public figures critical of Hezbollah often become subjects of systematic incitement and smear campaigns on social media, especially on X. Despite X’s limited reach in Lebanon – only about 9% of the population uses the platform – it remains a key space for professionals, journalists, NGOs, and coordinated groups, including Hezbollah-aligned avatar accounts.


The analysis suggests that most of these accounts do not appear automated but operated by individuals skilled in content creation and monitoring. These actors take initiative and align with the trending hashtags or narratives, amplifying Hezbollah’s ideological strategy and setting the daily agenda for supporters all over the world.


In Hicham Haddad’s case, the effort was significant. Within three to four days, 18 original pieces of media content – including response videos, animations, and even a song with a full video clip accusing him of Zionist allegiance – were produced. This level of production indicates both time and resources were invested. Notably, a video criticizing Haddad, initially shared by a Hezbollah-aligned account, garnered 300,000 views in just a few hours and eventually reached 600,000 views, suggesting its distribution was amplified through large public forums such as Telegram or WhatsApp. Another indicator of cross-platform dissemination is original video content shared by multiple accounts, suggesting they have received or downloaded the original file.


The behavior of these digital actors reflects Hezbollah’s communication strategy of empowering individuals, as articulated by Imad Mughniyah, one of the founding fathers of Hezbollah. His emphasis on the “power of the individual” within the organization appears to manifest online, where ideologically driven individuals -often operating from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and even Europe – act as autonomous “defenders” of Hezbollah’s narrative. They coordinate instinctively, much like a “pack of wolves responding to a single howl,” and often delete comments or accounts to evade detection. This decentralized yet unified behavior blurs the line between organized orchestration and organic response.


Additionally, some avatar accounts frequently use viral hashtag to either amplify a certain tweet with the aim to reach a wider audiences, or to deliver a subtle message that gets lost in the echo chamber like a needle in a haystack. This opens a question about the understanding of some avatar accounts that the hashtags are monitored by relevant parties. For example: after as Israeli strike on the town of Kahalé, in Mount Lebanon, an anonymous account tweeted: “Do not trust the Syrian army that gives you weapons; they are passing info to the Mossad.”


This information could have been trivial had it been tweeted from a standard account. However, since it came from an avatar account, using the Hicham Haddad hashtag – where it only garnered 150 views – suggests its intention was not to maximize public reach but to act as a message. Such accounts, often with usernames resembling coded structures like “alixswh3386267,” may be used to deliver sensitive information or advice in plain sight.  


Additionally, dozens of accounts appeared to have been created shortly before the campaign began, further indicating premeditated participation. While these individuals may not know each other personally, they are likely connected through shared ideological forums and platforms. Whether Hezbollah directly instructs them to act or simply relies on its planted ideology, the result is a coordinated digital response that amplifies the group’s narratives across the Arab world and beyond.

 

[1] Hezbollah, Islamic Republic of Iran, Syrian regime, Hamas, Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq, and Houthis in Yemen.

This report is published with the support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The contents of the report are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


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